Professor Michael May of Stanford University recently spoke on the topic of nuclear forensics at a CISAC forum. While certainly not a panacea for nuclear terrorism, Professor May believes that further development in identifying the origins of nuclear material (attribution) may take us another step closer to prevention. Like the popular TV show “CSI,” nuclear forensics is the scientific method for identifying the source of nuclear material. Typically, nuclear specialists use the unique isotopic signature found in radioactive material much like a fingerprint. Isotopes are any of the different forms of an element each having a different atomic mass (mass number). So if an amount of plutonium or uranium were to be intercepted on the black market, specialists would find its specific isotopic signature and determine its place of origin by comparing it to a database of known materials. Of course the actual scientific process is much more complex than this. But further development of the nuclear forensic field might offer some interesting possibilities in preventing nuclear terrorism.
Dr. May has pointed out that while nuclear attribution may not deter terrorist groups directly, it may lead to increased safety and security procedures on the part of those governments, businesses and individuals who handle nuclear related material. States, businesses and industry insiders would be less willing to proliferate and take extra care to avoid lapses in security if they knew a potential terrorist attack could ultimately be traced back to them.
Of course there are many hurdles to improved nuclear attribution; some scientific, others political and administrative. Scientifically, uranium remains harder to uniquely identify than plutonium. And with regard to nuclear terrorism, we are much more concerned with the use of uranium because it is more abundant and much easier to obtain, handle and deploy in a weapon. Politically a major hurdle is the development of a database containing isotopic signatures and their places of origin. Back to the “CSI” analogy, for a fingerprint identification to be successful the fingerprint must be matched to a fingerprint file in an established database. If not, it is simply a fingerprint with no name attached to it. Currently, there is no such comprehensive database for nuclear materials and some states may be reluctant to provide the information necessary to build one. According to Dr. May, the US has declassified all of its weapons’ isotopic signatures while Russia continues to regard this information as top-secret. Finally from an administrative point of view, the infrastructure for an international nuclear forensics program simply doesn’t exist yet. The equipment necessary for analysis exists but it isn’t mobile and therefore of little use to specialists who would need to be onsite in the event of a nuclear detonation. Other administrative questions about the structure of such an international forensics body loom large. What nations will compose the agency? In the event of an emergency will the agency get instant access to the blast zone for testing? How well can the agency coordinate activities with emergency response teams in the targeted country?
These are all big questions and nuclear forensics may not be the final answer to nuclear terrorism. But the ability to hold those in charge of the security of nuclear materials responsible for their actions (or inaction) may reduce the chances of a catastrophic nuclear attack.
For some further reading see the Stimson Center’s 2007 brief on nuclear forensics:
http://www.stimson.org/newcentury/pdf/NuclearForensicsWriteUp.pdf